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National Cereals and Produce Board (NCPB) Chairman Col (Rtd) Geoffrey
King'ang'i (centre) checks the quality of maize grains at Eldoret's NCPB
depot on June 28, 2016. He said a special team had been formed to
conducted analysis to determine the quality of maize and it would
present a report within next two weeks. PHOTO | STANLEY KIMUGE | NATION
MEDIA GROUP
By KARUTI KANYINGA
Agricultural parastatals have always been cannibalised,
literally, by placing management in the hands of incompetent managers.
Once in office, they create opportunities for their political godfathers
without a care about the future of the parastatal.
In the days of President Daniel arap Moi, some of those appointed often came to office quite broke. They would then use the parastatals to make money for themselves and their godfathers. Such plans included importing sugar and/or maize. Because the officials appointed to these posts had men of influence behind them (there were no women appointed to these posts), they would command the minister to legalise the imports or get him to buy in into the idea of importing the commodity. But to make huge profits fast and early, the process of importation would begin even before the relevant minister could authorise the imports. Once the commodity was in the high seas, the minister would issue the legal notice. Maize and sugar would flood the market. With money hitting their accounts, they would pressure the minister to freeze imports and re-introduce tax on imports.
This became especially the norm around election time or whenever any of them needed money to “keep off the opposition”. The bureaucrats at the Treasury and the ministry of Agriculture would use these opportunities to do “their own things” as well. Corruption spread in the ministries dealing with import licences and other taxes.
All these practices had an immediate impact on the agricultural sector. The parastatals for the various commodities declined. The management of the sector itself deteriorated while farming of particular crops such as coffee and tea went into ruins. But these were not the only factors that informed the decline of coffee and tea. The international market for primary commodities was also in a mess after the end of the cold war. The quota system, which allowed for withholding of coffee from the market when there was excess supply, was not operational after this and poor countries became more exposed in the new intricacies. This relationship between the agricultural sector and politicians is the cause of the woes that many farmers face. Unfortunately, recent discussions on how to revive, for instance, the coffee sector in the country fail to capture this unholy relationship.
The rot in the coffee sector and agriculture in general is attributable to several things. One of these is the relationship between agriculture and politics. This relationship is not recent. It began during the colonial days. The settlers’ interests led to the government establishing economic institutions to safeguard their interests. The Kenya Co-operative Creameries (KCC), the different versions of National Cereals and Produce Board (NCPB), and the Kenya Farmers Association (KFA) were born during the period. But these could not survive without political protection. Political institutions such as small political parties representing settler interests emerged to firm these interests. From then on, the political career of agriculture became intertwined with political interests of the dominant groups.
The rot particularly in the coffee industry resulted from President Moi’s shift of policy from export crops to cereals. While the government of President Jomo Kenyatta stabilised the economy by enhancing the export of coffee and tea, President Moi radically shifted to maize and wheat. In fact, during the reign of Jomo Kenyatta, the political career of many politicians in central Kenya was linked to the “political career” of the coffee tree. Politicians who did not demonstrate that they had fought hard to fetch good prices for the farmers would lose their seats. In the central Rift Valley, the tea crop developed a similar career. It terminated the political careers of politicians who showed no prove of what they had done to help farmers earn better income.
The government’s revenue base weakened and failed to balance support for export of commodities and farming for self-sufficiency. The shift did not take place only in terms of policy. The government orientation and official thinking saw withdrawal of extension services from these principal crops to areas where cereal farming was taking place: Rift Valley and parts of western Kenya.
The erosion of coffee and tea led to huge resentment of Kanu and the government of President Moi in the Mt Kenya region because it was generally seen as a strategy to weaken the political influence of the Gikuyu, Embu, and Meru. Of course even though the government had not initiated the policy shift to overtly punish these communities, the shift was interpreted as aimed at weakening the economic base of especially the Kikuyu for their support for the opposition. Without policy support, the farming of coffee, tea, dairy, and cotton declined. Some farmers uprooted their crop.
The policy shift toward food crops led to politicisation of agricultural usages. It led to increased attention to ethnic identities and the crops produced by each group. The linkage between agro-ecological zones and ethnic identity in Kenya took political shape during the period.
This gave Kenya’s climatic conditions political connotations that are poorly appreciated. This is because of a very simple reason. Kenya’s diverse climatic conditions have produced different agro-ecological zones. The zones are coterminous with different ethnic groups.
And because different ethnic groups are settled in different agro-ecological zones, or inhabit areas with different climatic conditions, the usages of these zones bear important ethnic identify. Mixed farming of coffee, tea, and dairy, among others, dominates the high potential regions of central Kenya; and the Central Rift Valley. In central Kenya are the Kikuyu and the Meru groups; while in the Central Rift Valley are the Kipsigis and the Nandi or the main Kalenjin sub-groups. In the Central Rift there is also extensive farming of cereal crops (maize and wheat) and sugar.
Medium potential areas of Kenya are found in parts of Eastern, the Coast, some parts of Nyanza, and Western region. The main groups here include the Kamba, Luo, and the Coastal groups. Many practice agriculture (maize, beans, and sugar farming), cotton, and livestock farming. Low potential areas are dominated by pastoralists. They are mainly in northern parts of the country.
This settlement pattern invites different reading of agricultural policies. If the government makes an intervention in one sector, other groups will predictably demand similar interventions.
An attempt to get politics off the agricultural sector was made in the earlier days of President Mwai Kibaki but with limited success. The minister for Co-operatives revived the dairy industry, while the minister for Agriculture attempted to revive the sugar, and coffee and the tea industries but failed to go far owing to increased demands to revive all sub-sectors at once. This led to increased politicisation of how ministers for Agriculture are chosen. From then on, things have never been the same. Never wonder why the ministry of Agriculture has remained in the hands of ministers from Rift Valley. Never wonder why the NCPB also remains in the hands of the same sub-group in the last three decades. The climatic weather conditions and politics have been in their favour for the last 38 years.
Prof Karuti Kanyinga is based at the Institute for Development Studies at the University of Nairobi; karutik@gmail.com.
CREDIT: NATION
In the days of President Daniel arap Moi, some of those appointed often came to office quite broke. They would then use the parastatals to make money for themselves and their godfathers. Such plans included importing sugar and/or maize. Because the officials appointed to these posts had men of influence behind them (there were no women appointed to these posts), they would command the minister to legalise the imports or get him to buy in into the idea of importing the commodity. But to make huge profits fast and early, the process of importation would begin even before the relevant minister could authorise the imports. Once the commodity was in the high seas, the minister would issue the legal notice. Maize and sugar would flood the market. With money hitting their accounts, they would pressure the minister to freeze imports and re-introduce tax on imports.
This became especially the norm around election time or whenever any of them needed money to “keep off the opposition”. The bureaucrats at the Treasury and the ministry of Agriculture would use these opportunities to do “their own things” as well. Corruption spread in the ministries dealing with import licences and other taxes.
All these practices had an immediate impact on the agricultural sector. The parastatals for the various commodities declined. The management of the sector itself deteriorated while farming of particular crops such as coffee and tea went into ruins. But these were not the only factors that informed the decline of coffee and tea. The international market for primary commodities was also in a mess after the end of the cold war. The quota system, which allowed for withholding of coffee from the market when there was excess supply, was not operational after this and poor countries became more exposed in the new intricacies. This relationship between the agricultural sector and politicians is the cause of the woes that many farmers face. Unfortunately, recent discussions on how to revive, for instance, the coffee sector in the country fail to capture this unholy relationship.
The rot in the coffee sector and agriculture in general is attributable to several things. One of these is the relationship between agriculture and politics. This relationship is not recent. It began during the colonial days. The settlers’ interests led to the government establishing economic institutions to safeguard their interests. The Kenya Co-operative Creameries (KCC), the different versions of National Cereals and Produce Board (NCPB), and the Kenya Farmers Association (KFA) were born during the period. But these could not survive without political protection. Political institutions such as small political parties representing settler interests emerged to firm these interests. From then on, the political career of agriculture became intertwined with political interests of the dominant groups.
The rot particularly in the coffee industry resulted from President Moi’s shift of policy from export crops to cereals. While the government of President Jomo Kenyatta stabilised the economy by enhancing the export of coffee and tea, President Moi radically shifted to maize and wheat. In fact, during the reign of Jomo Kenyatta, the political career of many politicians in central Kenya was linked to the “political career” of the coffee tree. Politicians who did not demonstrate that they had fought hard to fetch good prices for the farmers would lose their seats. In the central Rift Valley, the tea crop developed a similar career. It terminated the political careers of politicians who showed no prove of what they had done to help farmers earn better income.
The government’s revenue base weakened and failed to balance support for export of commodities and farming for self-sufficiency. The shift did not take place only in terms of policy. The government orientation and official thinking saw withdrawal of extension services from these principal crops to areas where cereal farming was taking place: Rift Valley and parts of western Kenya.
The erosion of coffee and tea led to huge resentment of Kanu and the government of President Moi in the Mt Kenya region because it was generally seen as a strategy to weaken the political influence of the Gikuyu, Embu, and Meru. Of course even though the government had not initiated the policy shift to overtly punish these communities, the shift was interpreted as aimed at weakening the economic base of especially the Kikuyu for their support for the opposition. Without policy support, the farming of coffee, tea, dairy, and cotton declined. Some farmers uprooted their crop.
The policy shift toward food crops led to politicisation of agricultural usages. It led to increased attention to ethnic identities and the crops produced by each group. The linkage between agro-ecological zones and ethnic identity in Kenya took political shape during the period.
This gave Kenya’s climatic conditions political connotations that are poorly appreciated. This is because of a very simple reason. Kenya’s diverse climatic conditions have produced different agro-ecological zones. The zones are coterminous with different ethnic groups.
And because different ethnic groups are settled in different agro-ecological zones, or inhabit areas with different climatic conditions, the usages of these zones bear important ethnic identify. Mixed farming of coffee, tea, and dairy, among others, dominates the high potential regions of central Kenya; and the Central Rift Valley. In central Kenya are the Kikuyu and the Meru groups; while in the Central Rift Valley are the Kipsigis and the Nandi or the main Kalenjin sub-groups. In the Central Rift there is also extensive farming of cereal crops (maize and wheat) and sugar.
Medium potential areas of Kenya are found in parts of Eastern, the Coast, some parts of Nyanza, and Western region. The main groups here include the Kamba, Luo, and the Coastal groups. Many practice agriculture (maize, beans, and sugar farming), cotton, and livestock farming. Low potential areas are dominated by pastoralists. They are mainly in northern parts of the country.
This settlement pattern invites different reading of agricultural policies. If the government makes an intervention in one sector, other groups will predictably demand similar interventions.
An attempt to get politics off the agricultural sector was made in the earlier days of President Mwai Kibaki but with limited success. The minister for Co-operatives revived the dairy industry, while the minister for Agriculture attempted to revive the sugar, and coffee and the tea industries but failed to go far owing to increased demands to revive all sub-sectors at once. This led to increased politicisation of how ministers for Agriculture are chosen. From then on, things have never been the same. Never wonder why the ministry of Agriculture has remained in the hands of ministers from Rift Valley. Never wonder why the NCPB also remains in the hands of the same sub-group in the last three decades. The climatic weather conditions and politics have been in their favour for the last 38 years.
Prof Karuti Kanyinga is based at the Institute for Development Studies at the University of Nairobi; karutik@gmail.com.
CREDIT: NATION
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