National Cereals and Produce Board (NCPB) Chairman Col (Rtd) Geoffrey
King'ang'i (centre) checks the quality of maize grains at Eldoret's NCPB
depot on June 28, 2016. He said a special team had been formed to
conducted analysis to determine the quality of maize and it would
present a report within next two weeks. PHOTO | STANLEY KIMUGE | NATION
MEDIA GROUP
By KARUTI KANYINGA
Agricultural parastatals have always been cannibalised,
literally, by placing management in the hands of incompetent managers.
Once in office, they create opportunities for their political godfathers
without a care about the future of the parastatal.
In the days of
President Daniel arap Moi, some of those appointed often came to office
quite broke. They would then use the parastatals to make money for
themselves and their godfathers. Such plans included importing sugar
and/or maize. Because the officials appointed to these posts had men of
influence behind them (there were no women appointed to these posts),
they would command the minister to legalise the imports or get him to
buy in into the idea of importing the commodity. But to make huge
profits fast and early, the process of importation would begin even
before the relevant minister could authorise the imports. Once the
commodity was in the high seas, the minister would issue the legal
notice. Maize and sugar would flood the market. With money hitting their
accounts, they would pressure the minister to freeze imports and
re-introduce tax on imports.
This became especially the norm
around election time or whenever any of them needed money to “keep off
the opposition”. The bureaucrats at the Treasury and the ministry of
Agriculture would use these opportunities to do “their own things” as
well. Corruption spread in the ministries dealing with import licences
and other taxes.
All these practices had an immediate impact on
the agricultural sector. The parastatals for the various commodities
declined. The management of the sector itself deteriorated while farming
of particular crops such as coffee and tea went into ruins. But these
were not the only factors that informed the decline of coffee and tea.
The international market for primary commodities was also in a mess
after the end of the cold war. The quota system, which allowed for
withholding of coffee from the market when there was excess supply, was
not operational after this and poor countries became more exposed in the
new intricacies. This relationship between the agricultural sector and
politicians is the cause of the woes that many farmers face.
Unfortunately, recent discussions on how to revive, for instance, the
coffee sector in the country fail to capture this unholy relationship.
The
rot in the coffee sector and agriculture in general is attributable to
several things. One of these is the relationship between agriculture and
politics. This relationship is not recent. It began during the colonial
days. The settlers’ interests led to the government establishing
economic institutions to safeguard their interests. The Kenya
Co-operative Creameries (KCC), the different versions of National
Cereals and Produce Board (NCPB), and the Kenya Farmers Association
(KFA) were born during the period. But these could not survive without
political protection. Political institutions such as small political
parties representing settler interests emerged to firm these interests.
From then on, the political career of agriculture became intertwined
with political interests of the dominant groups.
The rot
particularly in the coffee industry resulted from President Moi’s shift
of policy from export crops to cereals. While the government of
President Jomo Kenyatta stabilised the economy by enhancing the export
of coffee and tea, President Moi radically shifted to maize and wheat.
In fact, during the reign of Jomo Kenyatta, the political career of many
politicians in central Kenya was linked to the “political career” of
the coffee tree. Politicians who did not demonstrate that they had
fought hard to fetch good prices for the farmers would lose their seats.
In the central Rift Valley, the tea crop developed a similar career. It
terminated the political careers of politicians who showed no prove of
what they had done to help farmers earn better income.
The
government’s revenue base weakened and failed to balance support for
export of commodities and farming for self-sufficiency. The shift did
not take place only in terms of policy. The government orientation and
official thinking saw withdrawal of extension services from these
principal crops to areas where cereal farming was taking place: Rift
Valley and parts of western Kenya.
The erosion of coffee and tea
led to huge resentment of Kanu and the government of President Moi in
the Mt Kenya region because it was generally seen as a strategy to
weaken the political influence of the Gikuyu, Embu, and Meru. Of course
even though the government had not initiated the policy shift to overtly
punish these communities, the shift was interpreted as aimed at
weakening the economic base of especially the Kikuyu for their support
for the opposition. Without policy support, the farming of coffee, tea,
dairy, and cotton declined. Some farmers uprooted their crop.
The
policy shift toward food crops led to politicisation of agricultural
usages. It led to increased attention to ethnic identities and the crops
produced by each group. The linkage between agro-ecological zones and
ethnic identity in Kenya took political shape during the period.
This
gave Kenya’s climatic conditions political connotations that are poorly
appreciated. This is because of a very simple reason. Kenya’s diverse
climatic conditions have produced different agro-ecological zones. The
zones are coterminous with different ethnic groups.
And because
different ethnic groups are settled in different agro-ecological zones,
or inhabit areas with different climatic conditions, the usages of these
zones bear important ethnic identify. Mixed farming of coffee, tea, and
dairy, among others, dominates the high potential regions of central
Kenya; and the Central Rift Valley. In central Kenya are the Kikuyu and
the Meru groups; while in the Central Rift Valley are the Kipsigis and
the Nandi or the main Kalenjin sub-groups. In the Central Rift there is
also extensive farming of cereal crops (maize and wheat) and sugar.
Medium
potential areas of Kenya are found in parts of Eastern, the Coast, some
parts of Nyanza, and Western region. The main groups here include the
Kamba, Luo, and the Coastal groups. Many practice agriculture (maize,
beans, and sugar farming), cotton, and livestock farming. Low potential
areas are dominated by pastoralists. They are mainly in northern parts
of the country.
This settlement pattern invites different reading
of agricultural policies. If the government makes an intervention in one
sector, other groups will predictably demand similar interventions.
An
attempt to get politics off the agricultural sector was made in the
earlier days of President Mwai Kibaki but with limited success. The
minister for Co-operatives revived the dairy industry, while the
minister for Agriculture attempted to revive the sugar, and coffee and
the tea industries but failed to go far owing to increased demands to
revive all sub-sectors at once. This led to increased politicisation of
how ministers for Agriculture are chosen. From then on, things have
never been the same. Never wonder why the ministry of Agriculture has
remained in the hands of ministers from Rift Valley. Never wonder why
the NCPB also remains in the hands of the same sub-group in the last
three decades. The climatic weather conditions and politics have been in
their favour for the last 38 years.
Prof Karuti Kanyinga is based at the Institute for Development Studies at the University of Nairobi; karutik@gmail.com.
CREDIT: NATION
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